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Abstract: This commentary aims to take stock of the 2016 presidential 
elections in the Philippines that led to the landslide victory of the 
controversial Rodrigo Duterte. It argues that part of Duterte’s electoral 
success is hinged on his effective deployment of the populist style. Although 
populism is not new to the Philippines, Duterte exhibits features of 
contemporary populism that are befitting of an age of communicative 
abundance. This commentary contrasts Duterte’s political style with other 
presidential contenders, characterises his relationship with the electorate and 
concludes by mapping populism’s democratic and anti-democratic 
tendencies, which may define the quality of democratic practice in the 
Philippines in the next six years. 
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The first six months of 2016 were critical moments for Philippine democracy. In February, 
the nation commemorated the 30th anniversary of the People Power Revolution – a series of 
peaceful mass demonstrations that ousted the dictator Ferdinand Marcos. President Benigno 
“Noynoy” Aquino III – the son of the president who replaced the dictator – led the 
commemoration. He asked Filipinos to remember the atrocities of the authoritarian regime 
and the gains of democracy restored by his mother. He reminded the country of the torture, 
murder and disappearance of scores of activists whose families still await compensation from 
the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board. 
“Let me also remind you that the dictatorship has many faces,” Aquino warned the 
public. “That there are other personalities who want to reinstate all this – to deprive the 
people of the right processes, and put in the hands of one man the power to determine what is 
right and what is wrong, who is innocent and who is guilty” (Aquino 2016). 
He spoke of the creeping return of autocratic rule, embodied by the steady climb of 
then presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte in the polls. The foul-mouthed mayor of Davao 
City has been called “Duterte Harry” by both local and international press because of his 
reputation for violence when in office. Duterte’s campaign promise included a killing spree 
that would end in 50,000 dead criminals. Funeral parlours would be packed, and he said he 
would supply the corpses.  
It was not an effective warning. Three months after Aquino’s speech, Duterte won the 
presidency, in a landslide, with 16 million votes. 
 
2016: The Rise of the Populist 
A long view of Philippine power transitions makes Duterte’s win seem part of an inevitable 
pattern: the presidency has been alternately occupied by “reformist” and “populist” 
personalities (Thompson 2010). This “pattern” began in 1998 when Fidel Ramos – the 
“military reformer” who “achieved considerable success in bringing about economic reform 
through deft manipulation of old-style patronage politics” – was replaced by movie star 
Joseph Estrada, a “populist aggrandizer” who forged a deep relationship with the masses 
(Hutchcroft 2008, 144). Embroiled in corruption controversies and demonised for his alleged 
vices by the Catholic Church, Estrada’s rule was cut short in 2001 by a civilian and military 
uprising. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Estrada’s vice president and daughter of the ninth 
president, took over for the remaining three years of Estrada’s term. She promoted an agenda 
of good governance with the support of a coalition of civil society organisations. 
Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies?                            Curato, Nicole
  
3 
 
The legitimacy of Arroyo’s regime has been consistently challenged. Massive protests 
by Estrada supporters and a failed military coup by junior officers in 2003 illustrated the 
tensions between reformism and populism. Arroyo sought a fresh mandate by running for 
president in 2004. She narrowly defeated Fernando Poe Jr – a legend in Philippine cinema 
and one of Estrada’s closest friends. Arroyo’s slim margin over Poe exposed the endurance 
of populist appeal among voters. Here was a charismatic candidate with no political 
experience fighting neck-and-neck with the incumbent president. It was an election marked 
by credible reports of electoral fraud, with some precincts known to be Poe’s bailiwicks 
registering zero votes. The years after Arroyo’s re-election were spent cutting deals “with one 
sector after the other to legitimize itself at each turn” while quashing dissent from disgruntled 
military officers and protest movements (Mangahas 2001). Unlike Estrada, Arroyo was able 
to complete her term. But, like Estrada, she was arrested for plunder that included the misuse 
of over $8.8 million in state lottery funds. 
This is the context of Aquino’s rise to power. Running on the campaign slogan 
“where there is no corruption, there is no poverty,” Aquino’s 2010 campaign deployed 
discourses of reform, drawing political capital from the legacy of his heroic parents. The 
vocabulary of the Aquino regime is filled with civil society speak, invoking the phrases 
“transformational leadership” and daang matuwid (the straight path). 
In the 2016 presidential race, Aquino campaigned for Liberal Party candidate Manuel 
Roxas, who served as his interior secretary. Aquino reminded the electorate of the gains of 
his six years in power – rapid economic growth of 6.9% and improved performance in the 
global competitiveness ranking (from 86th place to 47th). Aquino ended his term with a 
“very good” net satisfaction rating, recovering from a dip in his performance at the beginning 
of 2016 (Social Weather Stations 2016). Continuity was the main message of the Liberal 
Party’s campaign. The message was carried from prepared speeches to ambush interviews, 
and was carried so consistently that Roxas officially added Daang Matuwid to his name on 
the ballot: Roxas, Mar Daang Matuwid (LP). 
But 2016 again saw a swing from reformism to populism. The swing appeared 
inevitable even in the early months of 2015, long before Duterte became a serious player for 
the presidency. It was incumbent Vice President Jejomar Binay who took on the populist 
mantle. Before beating Roxas for the vice presidency in 2010, Binay was the mayor of 
Makati City for over 20 years, except for a brief period where his wife Elenita took over his 
office due to term limit rules. 
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Binay “reoriented the machinery of Makati politics around his person as its peerless 
boss, as well as successfully styled himself the preeminent advocate for the ‘other’ [poor] 
Makati” (Garrido 2013, 179). For decades he forged personal relationships with his 
constituents, attending funerals and eating with his hands in town feasts. He institutionalised 
welfare policies, including free health care and education. Binay scaled up the politics of 
personal relationships nationally, patiently building relationships with local government 
officials all the way down to barangay (village) captains. These relationships provided the 
electoral machinery that delivered votes for Binay in his come-frombehind win of the vice 
presidential race in 2010. He used the same formula in 2016, coupled with populist campaign 
promises of expanding Aquino’s conditional cash transfer programmes to senior citizens and 
the scrapping of income taxes for low wage earners. 
Binay’s political achievement is not something that can easily be dismissed, but 
neither can it be romanticised. For a full year the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated 
Binay and his family over corruption allegations in the construction of a Makati parking 
building. The Anti-Money Laundering Council sought an order from the court to freeze 139 
bank accounts and 19 real estate properties of Binay, his family members and his close 
associates – allegedly serving as “dummies.” Binay refused to attend any of the hearings. He 
responded with an eight-page affidavit denying the accusations and opted instead to defend 
himself to the public. He sounded populist in dismissing all attacks against him as proof of 
the elitist government’s anti-poor agenda. “They don’t want us poor to come together,” he 
said in his advertisement. 
As corruption allegations continued to discredit Binay’s candidacy, his poll numbers 
dropped from 34% in June 2015 to 13% in May 2016. This was when Grace Poe, a junior 
senator who had set the record for securing the highest number of votes in the history of the 
Philippine Senate, entered the race. She saw a steady rise in her polling numbers. But she was 
not free from controversy either, facing cases in the Supreme Court questioning her status as 
a natural-born Filipino – a prerequisite for any presidential candidate. Poe, a foundling 
adopted by one-time presidential contender Fernando Poe Jr, also found her residency a 
subject of much debate. Most of her adult life had been lived in the US as a naturalised 
American citizen. 
Poe cleverly incorporated these attacks into her campaign message. Her slogan 
“Government with Compassion” was linked to her dramatic life story of triumph amidst 
persecution: The foundling, left at the steps of Jaro Cathedral and adopted by the superstars 
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of Philippine cinema, being harassed by vicious political opponents. Like Binay, Poe utilised 
the populist trope of equating her experience of persecution to the misery of everyday 
Filipinos. And, like Binay, she proposed wider access to social services, enumerated in a 20-
point agenda she outlined in her proclamation rally. Joseph Estrada boosted Poe’s populist 
credentials as the former president reminded the public of her family’s suffering when 
Arroyo stole the presidency from her father. 
Poe did not just bank on populism, but attempted to reach out to reform-minded 
constituencies. She surrounded herself with technocrats and progressive allies and styled 
herself as the champion of the Freedom of Information Bill in the 15th Congress. Her 
reformist claims were bolstered by an impressive performance in three presidential debates. 
Poe’s “middling strategy” of presenting herself both as a populist and a reformist worked 
until she reached the peak of her polling numbers at 27% two months before the elections 
(CNN Philippines, May 13, 2016). 
Liberal Party candidate Roxas, in spite of massive administration support, was never a 
frontrunner in any credible poll. His campaign, while establishing his promise of continuing 
Aquino’s reformist agenda, failed to gain him much traction. Attempts to make Roxas more 
likeable were made early in the campaign. He was fist-bumping athletes and dancing with 
teen stars in advertisements but this only produced contempt among the social media savvy 
electorate, with criticism that a privileged haciendero was trying to connect with the common 
person. His campaign switched gears early in 2016. Roxas portrayed himself as the serious 
candidate with “no drama” (unlike Grace Poe) who has no intention of stealing from public 
coffers (unlike Binay). This reimagined Roxas saw little impact on his poll numbers, which 
hovered around 15–20%. 
Binay’s populism and Poe’s “middling strategy” lost their currency as Duterte started 
climbing in the polls. He took the lead in April, and sustained his frontrunner status until the 
elections in May. His poll numbers did not take a hit from any of the controversies he created 
for himself. He cursed the Pope in November. He admitted he had multiple mistresses. He 
was accused of having undeclared bank accounts. In a last ditch effort to avert a Duterte win, 
Roxas held a press conference two days before the elections and also invited Poe “to talk.” 
Roxas warned that the “uncertainty and the spectre of a dictatorship are looming over our 
country once again,” although he did not explicitly identify Duterte in his statement (Roxas 
2016). This so-called “call for unity” was interpreted by some as a way of pressuring Poe to 
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bow out of the race and endorse Roxas instead. Poe flatly rejected the invitation on national 
television. 
Four hours after polls closed on May 9, 2016, at least 80% of votes had been 
transmitted to the Commission on Elections’ central server. It was the fastest transmission of 
election results in the Philippines’ brief history of automated elections. The 2016 elections 
also saw the highest electoral turnout in decades at 81.62%. Aside from a few issues of 
malfunctioning voting machines, reported cases of election-related violence and 11 towns 
declaring failures of election, observers generally considered the elections peaceful and 
orderly. Duterte maintained a commanding lead throughout the tally. 
 
Dutertismo as Political Style 
There are various ways to account for Duterte’s rise to power. His brand of populism is one 
of the most compelling approaches to make sense of his electoral victory. Populism may not 
be new to the country, but Duterte’s style is a departure. While Estrada and Binay were often 
compared to Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra, whose anti-elite rhetoric and pro-poor 
programmes were tainted with corruption scandals, by mid-2016, Duterte’s brand of 
populism was often compared to that of Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump in 
the US. 
This comparison has some basis, particularly when populism is understood not as an 
ideology as traditionally conceptualised in political theory, or a reaction to economic 
inequality as conceptualised in political economy, but as a “political style.” For Moffit 
(2016), contemporary populism is a “repertoire of performance” that builds the relationship 
between the leader as the performer and the people as the audience. To understand populism 
as performance, however, is not to dismiss it as superficial or purely aesthetic. Instead, 
appreciating populism as a political style foregrounds the reality that politics today is 
predominantly conducted in televised and digital media. Politics has become stylised such 
that its theatrical features have become central in enacting politics. This is particularly 
relevant in the Philippines where 94% of Filipinos have access to the internet and use social 
media. The digital media have become part of the news cycle, such that even those with no 
internet access know about the online discourses. Performance matters for pronouncements to 
get traction in the context of “communicative abundance,” where the issue is no longer the 
lack of information but the deficit of attention among audiences saturated with various 
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messages (see Keane 2013). For contemporary populists, media has become their stage of 
performance. 
The populist political style appears in various contexts, promotes a range of political 
leanings, and is practiced by various personalities. This makes Trump and Duterte’s political 
styles comparable. Yet their views are vastly different – Duterte is a selfproclaimed leftist 
who cites historic injustice as reason for Islamic insurgency and has taken a stand against 
unfair labour practices such as the hiring and firing of workers every five months so 
employers can avoid payment of benefits. Trump argues for the institutional discrimination 
of minorities and a rapid and extreme shift to the right. Nevertheless, their mammoth appeal 
hinges on a shared political style: the people versus the other, the performance of crisis and 
bad manners (Moffit 2016). 
The sequence of events that led to Duterte’s presidential run is a clear example of the 
theatrical nature of contemporary populism and the role digital media plays as the stage for 
the populist performance. There were rumours of a possible Duterte run in the months 
leading up to the filing of candidacy. Duterte denied these rumours, explaining that he was 
too old, too tired and too poor to run for president. At the same time, Duterte travelled across 
the country, giving speeches about federalism. This fuelled speculation that the mayor of 
Davao City had already begun a presidential campaign. In his typical tough-talking language, 
Duterte told his supporters to support other candidates because a Duterte rule “will be 
bloody.” On the final day for filing candidature, Duterte’s executive assistant submitted his 
documents to run for the mayorship of Davao City. While Binay, Poe and Roxas shook hands 
and waved at supporters after personally filing their candidacies, Duterte’s presence was only 
felt through the printing on the shirt his executive assistant wore. “A no is a no” was 
emblazoned in front. Lettered on the back were the words: “I told you I don’t want to [run], 
you’re being hard headed – Rody Duterte.” 
It could have been the conclusion of a dramatic series of events – the #DuterteSerye, 
as popularly called in traditional and social media – except that a little known personality 
from Duterte’s party, PDP-Laban, filed for president himself. The move was viewed as an 
opening for Duterte, as Philippine law allows for the substitution of candidates. Once again 
anticipation was created that Duterte’s “refusal” to run was a tease. Massive gatherings, fund 
raising appeals and online petitions were conducted nationwide to support the mayor’s 
candidacy. Duterte’s daughter, Sara, posted a photo of herself on Instagram with a shaved 
head, captioned with the hash tag #NoHairWeCare #justDuIt. The post went viral, given how 
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the Duterte family had been reportedly against a presidential run. The maybe-maybe-not 
dance kept Duterte in the limelight, scoring precious airtime in primetime news and headlines 
in broadsheets. Finally, in November, Duterte filed for a substitution of candidacy. 
The soap opera beginnings of Duterte’s presidential run set the tone for the rest of the 
campaign. He put on a spectacle that pushed the boundaries of traditional political practice. 
Sociologist Randy David (2016) characterises “Dutertismo” as “pure theatre – a sensual 
experience rather than the rational application of ideas to society’s problems.” Historian 
Vicente Rafael (2016) describes Duterte’s political rallies as “semiotic overdrive.” His 
campaign speeches were rambling and unstructured and peppered with swearing and sexist 
remarks. He was capable of going on for hours – and would have, if his 12-year-old daughter 
didn’t come on stage to ask him to wind up every now and then. For the length of his 
diatribes, he held the full attention of thousands of supporters crammed into stadiums and 
parks. His campaign rallies often ended with patriotic songs and the image of Duterte kissing 
the Philippine flag. 
Duterte’s brand of populism has a tricky relationship with democratic practice. On the 
one hand, it can be a force for democratisation, by making politics engaging to citizens 
turned off by politics as usual and elite control of office. On the other, it can reinforce anti-
democratic tendencies and legitimise authoritarian practice. Whether Aquino’s warning about 
creeping authoritarianism applies to Duterte has been the subject of intense debate among 
scholars and citizens. At best, the legacy of Duterte’s campaign for Philippine democracy has 
been mixed. 
 
Democratic Movement or Political Thugs? 
Take the case of the citizenry animated by Duterte’s campaign. If one were to focus on 
engagements online, there is considerable reason to think that Duterte-inspired public 
discourse follows his brash and vulgar tone. Compared to all candidates, Duterte had the 
most engaged fan base on Facebook and the most mentions on Twitter (Sinpeng 2016). A 
cursory investigation of posts on social media suggests that a culture of online thuggery has 
emerged. A student from the University of the Philippines, for example, received death 
threats after he confronted Duterte in a forum where the mayor gave a long-winded answer to 
his question. A Facebook group calling for his murder was set up, with an image of a 
tombstone engraved with the student’s name serving as the banner photo. Journalists have 
been barraged with comments about media bias each time Duterte gets what is construed as 
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unfavourable coverage. Duterte’s bad behaviour also finds defenders online, as in the case of 
his controversial joke about wanting to rape a dead Australian missionary. “Better a bad joke 
than a bad government,” said one supporter. The viciousness has gotten out of hand for one 
human rights activist who filed cases of harassment after she posted that “Duterte is a lazy 
choice. No one man can solve the problem. Discipline comes from ourselves.” The responses 
ranged from the insulting to the threatening. “Hey, stupid! I hope you get raped and your 
family massacred. Only then can you say your opinion,” is one of many she received. The 
Facebook profiles of these commenters reveal that the comments were written not by a fringe 
group of reactionary fanatics but “normal” citizens. They were mostly middle class and 
educated employees in call centres and banks who post photos of Jesus on Twitter and take 
selfies with Starbucks mugs. Opinion pieces have started calling out such practice as the 
makings of a fascist movement, where ordinary citizens have given up the Enlightenment 
virtues of tolerance and reason-giving, in support of a popular candidate. 
This, however, is only one side of Duterte’s support base. The situation is different 
offline, where Duterte’s grassroots support is nothing short of phenomenal. The size of his 
political rallies is record breaking, mostly composed of disparate groups of citizens, some of 
whom would borrow a couple of dollars to pay for a jeepney fare to rally venues. Overseas 
Filipino workers remitted money to their families to print banners they designed themselves 
to hang outside their homes. In some provinces, Duterte volunteers went around slum 
communities engaging in voter education programmes, driven by concerns that moneyed 
candidates might buy votes to beat Duterte. Supporters who complain of mainstream media’s 
bias against their candidate took it upon themselves to share online videos showing huge 
crowds listening to Duterte speak. 
Duterte’s populist style interrupted the usual practices of patronage during electoral 
campaigns. It has been common practice for people to be paid to attend a political rally, wear 
a campaign shirt and carry mass-produced campaign paraphernalia – the so-called hakot 
(transported) crowd. Duterte’s campaign was able to forge an authentic community of 
believers engaged in politics online and invested in action offline. This is not to say that 
Duterte has gone beyond traditional practices. It was not uncommon, for example, for local 
candidates to carry Duterte’s name in their sample ballots with money attached for vote 
buying. Nevertheless, the energy Duterte’s candidacy created among the citizenry is a 
significant achievement in a country whose elections has been described as run by guns, 
goons, gold and, recently, gigabytes. The 2016 electoral race saw the rise of a public that has 
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found its voice in the mayor of Davao City. Duterte has changed the tenor of political 
conversation. The tone is indignant, often violent, sometimes offensive, but it is hopeful 
nonetheless, and it has energised a citizenry once resigned to politics as usual. 
 
Democracy in Dark Times 
There are various accounts that make sense of Duterte’s phenomenal connection with 
committed supporters. For contemporary populism, a core feature of such connection has to 
do with the performance of crisis. Populism gets its impetus from the perception of an 
impending breakdown, real or imagined, which requires strong leadership to save “the 
people” from the “dangerous other.” While Binay, Poe and Roxas presented themselves as 
the most capable to reduce poverty and deliver the promise of inclusive growth, Duterte 
painted a more basic problem: the issue of order. Duterte’s political style is consistent with 
the so-called “global wave of populism,” where appeals to expertise, stability and progress 
associated with technocratic leaders are rendered irrelevant by firebrand populists who can 
successfully perform a crisis and find support among a frustrated public. 
Duterte performed crisis in various ways. In a forum where he first indicated his 
interest to run for president, he said, “If only to save this Republic, I can run for President.” 
He warned the audience of an “imminent disaster” if illegal drugs, criminality and stalled 
peace talks are not resolved. Framing the campaign in this manner presents a sharp contrast 
to how Aquino and Roxas described the state of the nation as one that is on track to 
development but needs another reformist push. For Duterte, the nation is on the brink “of 
being fractured,” and it takes a leader who can say, “if you don’t follow the law, you’re 
fucked with me.” Duterte’s framing of fighting illegal drugs as a major election issue gained 
traction, evidenced by a poll where low pay and illegal drugs became some of the top issues 
concerning voters (Pulse Asia 2016). This is a change from the usual issues that survey 
respondents identify outside the electoral season, where jobs, poverty and inflation are among 
the top concerns, while illegal drugs are not part of this list. 
Duterte’s language, needless to say, has been a cause for alarm. The literature of 
contemporary populism suggests that such “coarsening of political discourse” is integral to 
the populist style. Invoking the discourse of crisis requires a different political vocabulary. 
Gravitas, seriousness and sensitivity to others’ views are taken over by an apparent frankness, 
sensational language and the use of anecdotes as “evidence” as desirable qualities for a leader 
(Moffit and Tormey 2014, 392). 
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In Duterte’s case, his use of gutter language lends credibility to the urgency of saving 
the republic. By rendering the visceral rejection of the status quo visible, he gives voice to 
people’s frustration. Closely linked to Duterte’s exasperation-driven vulgarity is his politics 
of “I will.” His main campaign message was the suppression of criminality and drugs within 
three to six months. He offered no clear economic platform, except for a vague proposal of a 
shift to the federal system. His currency is his promise of certainty, anchored on the rhetoric 
of violence and machismo. 
Duterte’s approach to politics is not new. A candidate styling himself as a strongman 
has been a staple in national elections. Former Police Chief Panfilo Lacson ran for president 
in 2004 with the slogan “Iron Fist.” Metro Manila Development Authority’s Bayani 
Fernando ran as vice president in 2010 with the slogan “political will.” Neither of them was 
successful. Duterte’s appeal is different. He offers a compelling narrative of what can be 
done if he is in charge. He calls it Exhibit A: Davao City. 
Duterte’s Davao City was resonant in the campaign. It presented a working model of 
what Duterte could offer. He presented his imagined city as the murder capital of the country 
he transformed into one of the most competitive in city indices, named one of the Top 20 
Most Liveable Cities in Asia. Local government has been touted as a top performer, offering 
an effective 911-Emergency Response Service (now being replicated nationwide) and a 
streamlined process for securing business permits and other government services. All this, as 
the story goes, happened under the leadership of Rodrigo Duterte. 
Such a narrative had a broad appeal. For those who grew up in the conflict zones of 
Mindanao, Davao City offered the hope that a city in the south could become peaceful and 
prosperous. For wealthy Filipino-Chinese mothers terrified of kidnappings, Davao City is a 
peace and order paradise where there is a curfew for unaccompanied minors, taxi drivers are 
reliable, and laws on smoking and drinking are consistently enforced. For domestic workers 
in Hong Kong, Davao City offers the possibility of how government officials can work for 
the people, instead of scamming the people. For feminists, Davao presents a model for a 
progressive city with gender-sensitive ordinances which can overshadow Duterte’s sexist 
comments. The varied ways in which the Davao model can be appropriated allows it to gain 
traction in diverse constituencies. 
This imaginary, of course, is contentious. Crime statistics from the Philippine 
National Police list Davao City’s murder rate as one of the highest in the country. “You have 
to ask who are being murdered,” Duterte clarified, because “they are the criminals, gunned 
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down by vigilantes.” Part of the legend of Davao City is a series of stories about the summary 
executions of petty thieves, rapists and drug dealers. Human Rights Watch reported over a 
thousand lives claimed by the infamous Davao Death Squads during Duterte’s tenure as 
mayor of Davao City (Kine 2015). On his local television programme, Duterte mockingly 
said “I am the death squad,” provoking his critics to file cases against him. There has yet to 
be actionable evidence linking Duterte to the killings beyond his tolerance, if not support, for 
summary execution. 
While some Duterte supporters deny the existence of the death squads, others express 
moral complicity with such strategies to fight crime. Penal populism is the term sociologists 
of deviance use to describe the situation where the language of toughness, control and 
immediate gratification is prioritised over the long-term but tedious strategy of building an 
effective justice system (see Pratt 2007). Duterte vowed to give the police shoot-to-kill orders 
and pardon officers if they are charged with human rights abuses. He also calls for the 
restoration of the death penalty by hanging. 
Whether Duterte is offering an authoritarian fantasy or proposing a model for 
governing a democracy in times of crisis warrants further observation. What the campaign 
season reveals, however, is the importance of differentiating the demand for immediate 
results from the demand to restore dictatorship. After all, 76% of Filipinos are still satisfied 
with the way democracy works, based on a poll conducted in December 2015 (in Business 
World, February 24, 2016). Duterte himself declared that there was no need to impose 
martial law as current conditions do not demand it. What is evident is the distrust of the 
electorate, not with democracy, but with the intricacies of “good governance” and a criminal 
justice system that tests the politics of patience that democracy demands. 
Duterte’s discourse of “I will” laid bare the challenges when reformism places 
emphasis on taking the long view at the expense of immediately felt solutions to everyday 
problems that define citizens’ view of politics and power. The Aquino administration made 
substantial investments in human capital, such as shifting the educational system to the K-12 
model, expanding the conditional cash transfer programme and building capacities of local 
communities through bottom-up budgeting. Substantive reforms were also made in 
institutionalising transparency in infrastructure planning, government procurement and 
bidding. Missing in Aquino’s success story, however, are clear and direct outcomes that 
address the daily miseries of poverty, high levels of inequality, poor public transportation, 
and the shameful conditions of airports. While the impact of Aquino’s social services are felt 
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in some impoverished communities, the middle classes, especially in urban areas, are 
excluded from the story of Aquino’s reformism (ABS-CBN News, May 1, 2016). It is not 
accidental that aside from Mindanao, Duterte first gained popularity among middle class 
voters in urban areas, before his popularity cut across classes, age groups, regions and 
linguistic groups. 
Davao City offers a counterpoint to imagine possibilities for governance, where 
gentlemanly rules of democratic procedure give way to aggressive problem-solving. 
 
New Beginnings, New Exclusions 
“Change is coming” was Rodrigo Duterte’s battle cry in his bid for presidency. Indeed, at 
least as far as the 2016 race is concerned, change has come. Duterte’s populism has already 
transformed the tenor of the political conversation. He has broadened the scope of what can 
and cannot be said during an electoral race. Beyond the swearing are meaningful 
transgressions in the conservative vocabulary of Philippine politics. From screaming “Allahu 
Akbar!” in his final campaign rally to foreground his Maranao identity, to declaring he is a 
socialist, Duterte has brought to the political mainstream discourses that have been in the 
margins for decades. There have also been early indications of how the centre of power has 
shifted away from Manila. As the first president of the Philippines from Mindanao, it is not 
insignificant that all eyes are on Davao City a month after the elections. Duterte refused to 
travel to Manila even for his proclamation, and instead formed his cabinet and held press 
conferences in what journalists now call the Malacañang of the south. 
Part of populism’s capacity of including previously marginalised voices is its 
corollary logic of exclusion. Duterte’s language has offended women, journalists, the 
Commission on Human Rights, the diplomatic community and the United Nations. Davao-
based journalists who covered Duterte for years have shrugged off complaints about 
Duterte’s offensive language as an alarmist reaction from citizens using the prudish lens of 
“Imperial Manila” to understand the brash Bisaya. 
Duterte promised a “metamorphosis” after he won the elections, and committed to 
behaviour “more in keeping with the dignity of the office.” He delivered on this promise on 
his first day in office. In his inaugural address, he read a short and powerful speech free from 
expletives. He assured the public that he knows the limits of presidential power and vowed to 
adhere to due process and the rule of law. 
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This metamorphosis, however, seemed to apply only to the most formal of functions. 
Hours after his inauguration, the president started cracking jokes about the profitability of 
funeral parlours under his administration in a solidarity dinner with an urban poor 
community. In the turnover ceremonies of the Philippine National Police and Armed Forces 
of the Philippines, he once again resorted to off-the-cuff speeches. “There is time to rest and 
to die,” he said, pertaining to drug lords. And, in perhaps one of the most controversial moves 
in his first month in office, he publicly named top police generals, judges, and politicians 
who are part of the illegal drug trade. 
Duterte’s disregard for human rights has been the most worrisome aspect of his 
administration. “Human rights cannot be used a shield or an excuse to destroy the nation,” he 
declared in his first State of the Nation Address, a direct retort to his critics, who include 
human rights advocates, academe and the Roman Catholic Church. His police chief describes 
their anti-drug war as Operation Plan Double Barrel: “One touch of the barrel, two triggers 
will be set off. There’s a barrel that will target from above, the high-value targets. And 
there’s a barrel that will target from below, the street-level personalities.” One month after 
Duterte took office, there had been over 900 drugrelated killings, 700 anti-illegal drug 
operations, 700 arrests and hundreds of thousands of voluntary surrenders all over the 
country, further crowding jail cells already serving over five times their maximum capacity 
(see ABS-CBN Investigative and Research Group 2016). 
The six years of Duterte’s presidency will be a democratic experiment for the 
Philippines. Duterte’s politics of inclusion has taken shape in creating a diverse cabinet 
composed of Mindanao elites, members of the left endorsed by the Communist Party of the 
Philippines-National Democratic Front, a military official known for crushing the communist 
insurgency, traditional politicians, and former cabinet secretaries from the Estrada and 
Arroyo administrations. While Duterte has made campaign promises consistent with what 
might be considered a socialist agenda, such as putting an end to unfair labour practices, 
breaking up oligarchies and speeding up land reform, his broader economic agenda of 
attracting foreign investments and investing in publicprivate partnerships continues to take a 
neo-liberal character (Ibon 2016). 
Finally, it is important to focus on the character of the opposition and the civil society 
during the rest of Duterte’s term. The newly elected Congress was quick to form a “super 
majority” to support Duterte. The legislature – the branch of government mandated to check 
the executive – will be tested once thornier issues such as charter change, federalism and the 
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reimposition of the death penalty are discussed. A weak opposition compromises the 
democratic credentials of Duterte’s regime. President Duterte, a week after he assumed the 
presidency, enjoyed an unprecedented public trust rating of 91%. Some 63% of Filipinos 
think he will fulfil “most if not all” of his campaign promises. Some pundits have already 
used the term “fascism” to caution the public about the dangers of placing too much trust and 
support in a strong executive who makes no apologies for the killing spree. The future is 
hinged on finding the right balance for populism to be a force for democratic inclusion 
without lapsing into the legitimisation of its anti-democratic tendencies. Change is coming 
Duterte said, and, indeed, change is welcome, as long as it is change for the better. 
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